

Ethnicity and Refugees

Howard Adelman

No enduring world order can be created which ignores the ubiquitous yearnings of nations in search of roots in an ethnic past, and no study of nations and nationalism that completely ignores that past can bear fruit.¹

The New World Disorder

Once upon a time, not very long ago—in fact, a very short time ago—ideological conflicts between Western liberal democracy and authoritarian communism were acted out within the domestic politics of many less developed states. The two sides in a domestic conflict were supplied with arms by the superpowers of the two rival ideological blocs. Often, however, neither side in these domestic disputes identified itself with either ideology. Either bloc might have supported a military dictatorship with some depth of populist support. In fact, regimes supported by the United States were often an amalgam of traditional elites (feudal, military, financial) rather than liberal democratic constituencies. The regimes supported by the Soviet Union and China were more likely to identify themselves as communist or socialist.

In Vietnam, the result of this conflict in ideologies fought through surrogates was the largest resettlement program for refugees of the last quarter century. Five million Afghan refugees waited in Pakistan and Iran for the war to end, while proxies of the superpowers fought a purportedly ideological battle. The world considered most Ethiopian refugees to be products of ideological conflict, despite the nationalist origins of the war in Eritrea and other areas, because Haile Meriam Mengistu, the military dictator who usurped power in a coup, was an avowed Marxist.

Following World War II, the widely held belief that ideological conflict was

the root cause of refugee flight was the major premise for the world community's three solutions for their plight. Repatriation, local settlement in an adjacent country, or resettlement in a third country—in that order—were considered the only three forms of permanent solutions for refugees. For example, after the Cold War began, it was widely believed that Greek refugees could return to Greece once the communist insurgency was defeated and the new Western-oriented political system took hold. Similarly, in Afghanistan, it was expected that the refugees would repatriate after the fall of the communist government in Kabul—assuming it does fall.

The Western democracies led political and economic efforts to put this new set of solutions in place. It was the Cold War's humanistic side. The Western democracies underwrote the cost of maintaining refugee populations in states adjacent to the conflict until they could safely repatriate when the communist regime was defeated. Resettlement in a third country was only an option when victory over the communists in a reasonable time seemed doubtful—for example, the massive resettlement of refugees from Cuba and Vietnam in Western countries, primarily the United States.

These three post-World War II solutions to refugee situations were very different from the three international responses most widely accepted before World War II, when ethnic conflict was considered the primary cause of refugee flows, rather than economic or political ideology. During that period, three other permanent solutions were utilized: re-drawing borders, exchanging populations, and securing international guarantees for minority rights. The borders of many of the countries of Eastern Europe were set after World War I. One very small example among myriad was the plebiscite in Eupen-Malmedy to decide whether that small area on the western border of

Germany should go to Belgium or Germany. The large exchange of Greek and Turkish populations after World War I is perhaps the best known of these programs, but there were many other population transfers, including the idea of transferring the Arab populations of Palestine to facilitate setting up a Jewish homeland. Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, only partially included in the Treaty of Versailles, provided for the protection of minority rights. These solutions stand in marked contrast to the solutions mandated to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): repatriation, local settlement, and resettlement in a third country. They differ because the latter Cold War solutions are premised on the sanctity of national borders and on the integrity of sovereign states, a rationale arguably reflecting Western desires to resist the expansion of communist ideology.

In the last two years, we have witnessed the demise of an ideological system that has dominated the Soviet people for seventy years, and much of Eastern Europe and Asia for forty years. Perhaps even more remarkable has been the resurgence of faith in liberalism and even capitalism among those throwing off the yoke of oppression. But at the same time, we have also seen ethnic conflict reemerge as the primary cause of population displacement. Certainly, in Eastern Europe, borders are under question as the Soviet empire collapses from the weight of its own economic mismanagement and suppression of freedom.

And this is only the beginning. The implosion of India, of Indonesia, of Nigeria—the largest country in Africa—has yet to occur, though each has had or is experiencing degrees of rebellion against central state authority. The rebellions of ethnic groups such as the Sikhs or of the Ibos in these countries were not akin to the secessionist southern states of the United States, forced to reunite to forge the common American nation. For India, Indonesia, and Nigeria are not nations forged by states. Rather, each consists of nations that

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World Refugee Survey—1992



A Kurdish refugee family in the mountains of Iran. "Today, Saddam Hussein again makes a pretense of recognizing Kurdish autonomy, which he will again undoubtedly undermine when he regains the power to do so." Middle East Watch/S. Marks

existed prior to the construction of the state.

When we consider the possibility of nationalist forces erupting all over the world in a way that will make the present period appear relatively tranquil, two key questions arise. Will the world abandon the Cold War refugee solutions for those in place before World War II? More seriously for refugees, will Western, particularly U.S. support for any systematic resolution of the refugee condition wane with the demise of the Cold War?

Certainly, in Europe, North America, and Australia, there has been growing resistance to the large number of spontaneous arrivals claiming refugee status. The numbers are not the only problem. The high cost of processing individual claims for refugee status through a quasi-judicial system weighs upon the overburdened economies of these states. The

relatively small numbers that are actually deported after this whole cumbersome process is finished is another factor. The fact is that the refugee claims system is increasingly perceived as a back door for immigration used by those fleeing economically depressed and strife-torn regions. Western states believe they are losing control over their borders and their own rights to self-determination, including the right to determine who can and who cannot become members of their polity. The legal system so painfully constructed after World War II was created to protect refugees fearing persecution from a tyrannical state apparatus. With the demise of any ideological motive, will the humanitarian motive be insufficient to preserve refugee protection when the causes of refugee flows increasingly result from messy conflicts between rival nationalities and potentially much larger mass movements of refugees?

Nationalism and Ideology

To get some handle on this shift or reversal in the prime cause of refugee flows—from ideology, or military coups in the guise of ideology, to conflicts between nationalist groups—an outline sketch of ethnicity or nationalism as a source of conflict and refugee flows might be helpful.²

Unlike the two competing universalist ideologies—communism, which claimed to be a scientific and collective solution, and liberal capitalism, based on the primacy of the individual—nationalism is depicted as a belief which glorifies "the peculiar and the parochial, national differences and national individualities,"³ and which has as its goal the "national self-determination, and the lasting fulfillment which comes to man when he lives as a member of a sovereign nation."⁴

Some have further argued that nationality demands exclusivity and homogeneity, a vision attributed (erroneously, I believe) to the heritage of the Hebrews. Christianity inherited the universalistic strain of Messianism, according to this interpretation, by building on the spiritual and cultural heritage, while nationalism was erected on a primitive racial and materialistic conception to develop a nationalistic Messianism considered as "the will to live dominantly and triumphantly as a rehabilitated people in a national home."⁵

The people. The home. In fact, nationalism itself has not been the problem. The problem has always been determining who belongs to a nation and the territory which belongs to that people. Whether nationalism is defined as a desire to belong to the same legal and political system (a *Staatsnation*), or is defined in terms of language, culture, and religion (*Kulturnation*),⁶ there remains the question of where to draw territorial borders. Should the Catholics of Northern Ireland be allowed to secede and join the Irish Republic?

The demise of communism has resurrected the nationalist question in Eastern Europe as a primary issue. Of course, it was always a central issue that Marxists could not resolve. Rosa Luxemburg, the founder of the Social Democratic Party of Poland, denied there was a right to national self-determination, and opposed nationalism in principle as leading to fragmentation. Lenin, in contrast, emphasized the right of self-determination, but also

recognized the tendency to fragmentation. As a result, the Soviet Union gave self-determination *de jure* recognition, but ultimately denied the principle any realization in practice. Initially, the Soviet revolutionaries under the Leninist doctrine recognized the independence of the Baltic republics. Stalin, who all along had opposed Lenin's recognition of the right to national self-determination,⁷ reabsorbed them into the Russian Empire at the first opportunity.

Fifth columnists were used to take over independent revolutionary governments in republics such as Azerbaijan and Armenia, which then "voluntarily" joined or became subordinate to the power of the Soviet federation. This failed only where and as long as Western military intervention (an expeditionary German force in Finland, for example) or the defeat of the Red Army allowed independent nation-states to sustain themselves. Communists could not tolerate secession and the realization of national self-determination. A case in point is Yugoslavia, where Marshal Tito, more tolerant of nationalist self-determination than any other communist ruler, also clamped down on the Croatian secessionists in Yugoslavia in 1972. Today, with the demise of communism, nationalism has risen in Yugoslavia, and communists who retain power in Serbia have been unwilling to accept the secession of Croatia, particularly since large numbers of Serbs live there.

The issue of national self-determination also permeates non-European conflicts around the world with migratory implications. Eritrea, a former Italian colony, was forcefully made a federated state of Ethiopia by the United Nations after World War II, with the right of self-determination after ten years. However, not only was that right denied, but even Eritrea's limited autonomy was taken away. The twenty-two million Kurds, promised an independent state after World War I, were in fact divided up among Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Today, Saddam Hussein of Iraq again makes a pretense of recognizing Kurdish autonomy, which he will again undoubtedly undermine when he regains the power to do so. China refuses the right of Tibet to self-determination, as does any government that believes that power comes out of the barrel of a gun rather than from the consent of a free people.

What attitude does today's victorious universalist belief, democratic liberalism, have towards nationalism? A more pragmatic one. In the short term, stabil-

ity was primary for the development of capitalism. In the name of international peace and order, after World War I, national self-determination, the division of each separate nationality into a sovereign state, was to be the guide in the subsequent peace agreement. The Czechs, the Slavs, the Romanians, the Kurds, the Arabs still ruled by Turkey—all were promised their own states. The major principle running through Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points was the right of all peoples to live in liberty and safety. Frontiers were to be redrawn along "clearly recognizable lines of nationality." Why?



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The answer goes back to the nineteenth century and John Stuart Mill's Whig theory of nationalism. Nationalism was not valued in itself, but was simply considered useful because the commonality of a people tended to give representative government a better chance of working. Government by and for the people was the primary principle, not nationalism. According to Mill,

A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others—which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or any portion of themselves exclusively.⁸

It was a vision of *Staatsnation* united by inner identification and sentiment and fused together by a collective act of will to create a common legal system.

That meant, however, where national self-determination might lead to disorder and conflict, or where liberty was not an immediate prospect, self-determination—the first principle of the League of Nations—was sacrificed to the need for international order. The mandate system was established after World War I by the Treaty of Versailles to administer the former colonies of the German and Ottoman Empires to implement Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant providing for the provisional recognition of *independent* (my italics) nations, with the Mandatory authority only required to render administrative advice and assistance. It ended up not as a vehicle for the orderly development of self-government of a people, but as a mode of perpetuating imperial control through zones of influence, allowing national conflicts, as in the case of Palestine, to fester. The recognition of national self-determination was subordinated to the interests of the imperial powers almost as much in the West as in the new communist empires of the East.

Lord Acton, the author of the famous statement, "Power corrupts; absolute power corrupts absolutely," held that nationalism was not only an illegitimate but a dangerous and irrational force. "Making the nation the mold and measure of the State" had to be subordinated to what was in effect a superior military power. For Acton, a state monopoly on military power to keep various nationalities in check was preferable to systems built on purely nationalist lines. Thus, the nationalist rivalries within India and Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) were suppressed. Today, the world is the inheritor of those suppressed conflicts, and refugees are the product of the angry and intolerant form in which they have reemerged.

**Nationalism—Scourge or
Creative Force**

Others have defended nationalism, not simply as a useful tool of liberalism (John Stuart Mill) or of communism (Lenin), but as a good in its own right—nationalism, not as mother of all wars, but as "the mother of all creations on earth." For nationalism has been identified with a life force, "innate, organic, and genetic," the basis of natural power and the inner genius of being.⁹ "A nation is as natural a plant as a family, only with more branches," said J. G. Herder. "Nothing, therefore, is more manifestly

contrary to the purpose of political government than the unnatural enlargement of states, the wild mixing of various races and nationalities under one sceptre."¹⁰

War for conquest, according to Herder, is not the result of nationalism, but its antithesis. A nation is an extended family, endowed by its members with sympathy and fellow feeling, the basis of molding humans together into nations willing to defend each other from conquest by others, but also the basis of caring for all of humanity.

However, some, such as J. G. Fichte, derived from this idea a rationale for dreaming of a homogeneous nation where the national will would not be contaminated. The individual was to identify totally with the nation, and the state would regulate all aspects of the individ-

ual's life. This process of identification entailed purifying the nation, expelling minorities, and uniting all those of the same language and nationality under the same political roof, hence, requiring the elimination of "internal" borders and further purges of minorities that were weakening the national fabric. Individual rights and individuals apart from the state were phantoms.

Other thinkers, such as G. W. F. Hegel, moved in the opposite direction. Nationalism had to be subsumed under the rule of law and a state structure, not because nationalism per se was inherently dangerous, but because its fullest expression of freedom would be unrealized if it merely reflected tradition and custom, or even self-conscious cultural expressions and activities. A *Kulturnation* had to become a *Staatsnation*. Individual rights had to be

codified in laws and principles that explicitly recognized and protected freedom as fundamental. And those laws and principles had to be made universal and international. This, in fact, has been the case with the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and other agreements that have evolved for the protection of refugees. Nationalism that manifests itself in the rule of law leads to a state that defends rather than suppresses differences, that protects individual and minority rights rather than oppressing individuals and rejecting minorities from living in or participating in the state.

This interpretation holds nationalism not as something given and primordial that exists outside the trajectory of history, but as a product of history. Nations have disappeared. Nations have been reborn. Nations have combined. At those magical turning points that occur in history and through which we are once again living, those elements so constitutive of a *Kulturnation*—rooted in ethnic consciousness, common language, memory, and symbols—reassert themselves for a place in the sun and for an opportunity to find a political and legal form that will protect the continuity of those people.

There is, however, in this view, another reason for nations to be constituted in a state. Nations have to have their own states so they can properly live under the rule of law and have the full benefit of freedoms guaranteed to all. Nationalism, in this sense, is not merely a convenient tool of Whig ideology to unite people so they can elect governments that protect the right of every individual to pursue his or her own selfish interests. Freedom is not just the right to pursue self-interest. Freedom is a matter of universal right, and one that has to be guaranteed to all by the rule of law, a rule of law that, though administered through states, must become universal.

But nationalism—the basis for building states, the rule of law, and the protection of freedom in its fullest sense, and not merely the right to pursue one's own self interest—can also be used for xenophobic and destructive purposes, for expressing subjective feeling at the expense of another nation. To ensure against this, all nations have needed states to make the rule of law and the protection of rights and freedoms primary. The break up of imperial states, the desire for nations to realize the expression of their unique identities through a sovereign state, is not the road to ruin but the path to a new international order built on the rule of law and

Tamil civilians in Sri Lanka. "The nationalist rivalries within India and Sri Lanka were suppressed. Today, the world is the inheritor of those conflicts, and refugees are the product of the angry and intolerant form in which they have reemerged." USCR/C. Robinson





A six-year-old refugee boy sits amidst the debris of a hotel room after a night of shelling by Serbian troops in Dubrovnik, Croatia. AP

the protection of the freedom of individuals, the equality of groups, and the full realization of each unique nation.

Nationalism and Freedom

An ethnic group is not a nation. For a nation requires a territory in which it is dominant, a state that protects and develops the unique qualities of that nation but also protects the equal rights of all its citizens under the rule of law. However, if the state is also dedicated to protecting and enhancing the ethos of its dominant nationality, as Giuseppe Mazzini, the father of Italian nationalism, postulated in his essay, "The Duties of Man," the responsibility for preserving and enhancing the national character means that all citizens have to be inculcated with a common national tradition. This poses problems—both for the right of individuals to deviate and to challenge the thinking and the symbols of that nation, as well as for the rights of ethnic minorities to preserve their own national traditions within the envelope of a legal state where they are citizens.

Is it an expression of freedom to burn the flag of the United States when chal-

lenging the militaristic side of the American national tradition? Is it an expression of cultural and religious freedom for a Sikh to enroll in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and insist on wearing a turban, challenging the traditional image of the uniform of that force? Is it an expression of freedom to insult the head of state whether she be a monarch who inherited her throne, an appointed ex-politician, or an elected official?

These are the simple issues. What happens when two nationalities have claims to the same territory—Palestine, the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh inside Azerbaijan? What happens when several nationalities share the same territory and state, and one of them is not dominant, as in Uganda? What is the national ethos? The fact is that the national question appears easier to solve when a "new nation" is being founded under a secular constitutional faith, as in the United States, so that the national sensibilities of various minorities and indigenous nations can presumably be ignored in the energy and determination to forge a new nation. Individuals may get protection, but not ethnic minorities. But if an indigenous nation becomes dominant in a state, as the English did in the British Isles, what

happens to the Celtic nations—the Scots, the Irish, the Welsh, the Cornwallians? What happened in France to the Bretons and Basques? What happened in Spain to the Basques and Catalans? What happened to the non-Magyar minorities as the Magyars attempted to assimilate forcibly the various minorities in what would become Hungary? Minority rights, particularly political, language, and cultural rights, tend to be swamped by the ambitions and energies of the newly flourishing nation. And if a nation is divided among a number of separate states, such as was the case with the Germans and Arabs, a pan-nationalist nationalism tends to be the most intolerant of all other national minorities, frequently blaming them for sapping the strength of unity from the national ethos.

But when there are a number of nations competing for primacy in a new state, as in many states in Africa, the national competition often becomes both a vehicle and an excuse for the primary authority of the state to shift from the rule of law to the rule of force, since the state has presumably been given the monopoly on the use of coercive force. Whether a state is used to forge and unite a nation, as in the nations of the new world or the ex-colonial states, or

when a nation seeks to preserve itself in a state, as in indigenous and pan-nationalist movements, minorities and individual rights always seem to be at risk. The risk is much greater when attempts are made to forge a nation within the boundary of a former colonial state or when attempts are being made to unite states through the energies of a pan-nationalist movement.

What then do we make of developments in the new Europe, with its attempt to forge a superstate out of many nations? What we have is the raising of the right of free passage of goods, services, and people from the nation-state to the superstate, the realm of European Community as a whole. Further, Europe not only has the duty of creating an economic community, but a common community of rights under the rule of law protected by the court in Strasbourg.¹¹ Once the nation had secured its national identity through sovereign control of the apparatus of state, the instrument of a superstate through the voluntary will of its constituent nations could be used to broaden and entrench both the economic freedoms and human rights of individuals, which is the responsibility of a state apparatus. For though the superstate, and European integration in particular, poses some risk to national identity, its primary function is to ensure the preservation of that national identity lest internecine wars or superpower battles end up destroying Europe altogether.¹² There is also a danger, minor I believe, that Europe will be used to forge a new European nationality, a new nation forged by a state along the lines of the United States but without the language and the culture, and in doing so become xenophobic in relation to Asian "hordes" or Muslims and create that unity based on a mythical Christian European identity.

I believe we are entering a new world order different from those following World War I and World War II. It is one that will recognize the fundamental legitimate rights of nations to have a sovereign state of their own and not sacrifice that right to preservation of a false and temporary stability. This means that borders will no longer be sacrosanct. There will be a danger of greater instability. But if this new emergence of nationality is also accompanied by the insistence on the rule of law and the protection of the rights of individuals and of minorities, it need not entail forced transfer of populations in a silly, fruitless, and destructive effort to create

homogeneous nations within a state. What emerges will look like the resurrection of the post-World War I system, but with voluntarism replacing coercion as the basis for change and the rule of law on a superstate level replacing aggression by individual states in the defense of the rights of minority populations coerced into flight.

The new international order for the protection of refugees must blend some of the methods of protecting refugees and the rights of nations developed after World War I with the development of superstate law and the legal protections for rights and refugees developed in the aftermath of World War II. This would mean that borders are redrawn, but it should be done through a legal process. It will mean that populations will move, but this should occur in a more orderly fashion. It will mean that human rights protections will extend to minorities and be subject to international responsibility. But it will also mean that the existing regime of access to protection by other states must be maintained for refugees fleeing persecution. The 1951 Refugee Convention and its Protocol must continue to be expanded both to other states and through the development of state procedures for ensuring that those protections are to have the appropriate administrative and quasi-judicial apparatus to ensure that refugee protection is not a matter of mere principle. Thus, while the existing regime for refugee protection is preserved and expanded, both quantitatively and qualitatively, steps must be taken to rearrange the political order so that the situations that give rise to refugees are eliminated. Otherwise, Europe and North America, when flooded with refugees from these conflicts largely rooted in ethnic disputes, will more and more seek ways to deter refugees from entering, but without putting in place the instruments to counter the forces that give rise to the flows in the first place.

Notes

1. Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origin of Nations*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, p. 5.
2. Ethnicity is not to be equated with nationalism. Ethnicity is older. However, if one accepts the division between two different roots for ethnicity in the pre-modern era, lateral and extensive aristocratic ethnic constellations which include scribes and the wealthier merchants, and vertical, intensive urban and artisan or tribal based and more exclusive constellations (cf. Smith 1986), then the two forms of ethnicity can be roughly correlated

with the two forms of nationalism, state-nationalism and cultural nationalism, respectively.

3. Hans Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History*, Princeton, Van Nostrand, 1955, p. 15.
4. Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*. London: Hutchinson, 1985, p. 90.
5. Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study of its Origins and Background*. New York: Collier, 1944, p. 45.
6. This distinction was made by the German historian and nationalist, Friedrich Meinecke in *Cosmopolitanism and the Nation State*. Karl Deutsch, in *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality*, made these two conceptions necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for defining a nation.
7. In 1913, Stalin wrote *Marxism and the National Question*, in which he depicted language, territoriality, economic unity, and culture as four necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for being a nation. As the first Commissar of Nationalities in the Soviet Union of 1917, he was able to use this theoretical thesis to deny the reality of a nation because it lacked one of the necessary conditions and then to attempt to forge a united economic sphere which would ensure that he could continue to reject any ultimate status to a nation.
8. J. S. Mill, *On Representative Government*. Opening of Chapter XVI, "of Nationality, As Connected With Representative Government." London: J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd. 1910, pp. 359-60. For a contemporary analysis that puts forth an instrumentalist view of nationalism combining the liberal political ideology of Mill and liberal capitalist theory of nationalism as a tool to mobilize labor as the elites attempt to accumulate wealth and power, cf. Daniel Bell, "Ethnicity and Social Change" in Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan (eds.), *Ethnicity, Theory and Experience*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975. For extensive empirical research to support this thesis, see Fredrick Barth (ed.), *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*. Boston: Little Brown, 1969. There are, of course, other accounts that explain nationalism away as mere epiphenomenon in the development of liberalism and capitalism rooted in the development of technology and culture rather than in the economy as espoused in the works of Marshall McLuhan, which correlate nationalism with the development of the printing press and the possibility of mass literacy in the language of the masses. Two variations on this theme are put forth by Benedict Anderson (*Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: New Left Book, 1983) and Ernest Gellner (*Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983).
9. F. M. Barnard, tr. and ed., *J. G. Herder on Social and Political Culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969, pp. 291-293. For contemporary sociobiological versions of this interpretation, see R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong, *Genetic Seeds of Warfare: Evolution Nationalism and Patriotism*, Boston: Unwin Human, 1989.
10. Ibid, p. 324.
11. Peter Alter's book, *Nationalism* (London: Edward Arnold, 1989), tends to stress the development of a superstate system while supporting nationalism as an indispensable stage in the development of the new world order. But it is only a stage, not an indispensable part of the ultimate order. This is perhaps why he was so mistaken in celebrating Slovene loyalty to the Yugoslav state and suggesting that, "in trying to facilitate the coexistence of several nations and nationalities in a federalist, multinational polity, the pioneering Yugoslav state had made decisive headway in solving an old problem." (p. 134)
12. This is in fact the way most Europeans view the nationalist question in relation to the European community. See Helene Riffault, "Comparative Research on National Identities: The Lessons of Surveys Conducted in the Twelve Countries of the European Community," *Innovation*, Vienna (1991), 4:1, pp. 31-40.